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Abstract In the last days of the electoral campaign for the 2004 general election in
Spain, on Thursday March 11th 2004, a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused
the death of 191 persons in commuting trains in the capital Madrid. Four days later,
the opposition party won the election, against all predictions that were made prior
to the terror attacks. This change in expectations presents a unique opportunity to
take advantage of event study techniques to test some politico-economic hypotheses.
The quantitative exercise is carried out employing Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR). Hypothesis testing is improved by means of bootstrapping techniques. Con-
vergence theories prove quite resilient as, jointly, quoted firms were not significantly
affected by the election outcome. The impact on politically connected companies and
particular economic sectors, however, suggest that a combinationof capture and agency
problems may play a role in explaining the effects of the change in expectations.
Keywords Event study · Median voter · Agency · Capture · Elections ·
Political connections
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1 Introduction
In the last days of the campaign for the 2004 general election in Spain, on Thursday
March 11th 2004,1 a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused the death of 191 per-
sons in commuting trains in Madrid. The attacks themselves, according to some, or a
deliberate attempt by the incumbent government to hide information about the attacks
for electoral reasons in the short period of time between the attacks and the elec-
tion, according to others, are held responsible for the surprise victory of the Socialist
opposition in the election on the next Sunday. This change in expectations presents
a unique opportunity to take advantage of event study techniques2 and use the natu-
ral experiment to test some economic and politico-economic hypotheses. One of the
problems of many event studies is that long event windows run the risk of including
effects of events other than those under analysis; the fact that in this case the election
result could not have been predicted four days before the election greatly reduces the
meaningful length of the event window and hence the potential for event contamina-
tion, except for the potential confusion between the attacks themselves and political
change, something we deal with in Sect. 5.
The Median Voter Theorem3 predicts that if two vote-maximizing parties com-
pete in a single political dimension, and voter preferences are single peaked, then
both parties converge presenting the platform that best suits the median voter. The
theorem, an application by Downs (1957) of the Hotelling (1929) location model,
tries to explain the strong forces towards convergence to the centre of the ideological
spectrum that are observed in politics. The median voter theorem has been used in
many applications in economics and has become one of the workhorse models of the
literature on political economy (see Persson and Tabbellini 2000). However, many
authors have pointed out that there is evidence that political parties often differ in
some important policy dimensions, so that politics would be partisan4 instead of con-
vergent; Roemer (2001) wonders why would a group of citizens bother to undertake
the costs of creating a political party if they end up implementing the same policies
as their main rival. Which of both theories does evidence support? This question may
have different answers depending on time and place. We test it for one country and
place were, according to political rhetoric, one would expect to find high divergence:
Spain in 2004. In the months prior to the election, Prime Minister (or President of
Government, as it is called in Spain, where the head of state is the King) Aznar had
supported U.S. President Bush on the Irak war, for example, a move that was strongly
criticized by the opposition. Socialist Party main opposition candidate José Luis R.
1 Electoral campaigns in Spain usually end on Friday, and Saturday is “reflection day.” Vote is on Sunday.
2 See Binder (1985, 1998), MacKinlay (1997) and Khotari and Warner (2007).
3 See Downs (1957).
4 See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). Petterson-Lidbom (2008) find partisan effects at the local level in
Sweden, but Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) show that at the local level partisan effects of Mayoral elections
in the U.S. are weaker than at the national level.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:83–112 85
Zapatero was according to some commentators to the left of previous socialist leader
Felipe González. It was also a period of increasing polarization in many countries
(including the US) between the main political parties. Being Spain a member of the
European Union in the Euro area, however, implies that the forces of convergence are
also strong, as the European Union establishes very strict norms of fiscal policy and
controls monetary policy through the European Central Bank. Whether convergence
or partisan forces are stronger is ultimately an empirical question.
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of elections on shareholder’s expecta-
tions, and we contribute to this literature. For example, Roberts (1990), Shum (1995),
Herron et al. (1999), Herron (2000), Pantzalis et al. (2000), Vuchelen (2003), Jensen
and Schmith (2005), Leblang and Mukherjee (2005), Füss and Bechtel (2006) and
Jayachandran (2006) find different degrees of convergence depending on time and
country. Like Jayachandran (2006) we analyze the effect of a surprise political event.
But we do it with econometric techniques that improve the reliability of significance
tests, such as the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions method and bootstrapping.
We find that, in spite of rhetoric, investors did not expect significant differences
between both major Spanish political parties. The expectation was that the degree of
convergence in policies affecting the average profits of firms in the overall market
would be high.
Even though our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of no impact from the
change in Government on the expectations for the Spanish economy as a whole, we
also test whether the surprise election result had an impact on specific sectors and
politically connected businesses. If a businesses′ allegiance to the incumbent politi-
cal party had a positive or a negative impact on its profits, an unexpected change in
Government will result in a negative (or positive) impact on the firm’s financial value.
The analysis shows that such hypothesis of capture of politicians by firms, in itself
and combined with agency problems in privatized firms with dispersed shareholdings,
is not rejected by the data. This is revealed by examining both sector and groups
of individual stock price reactions to the surprise electoral result, particularly where
businesses are identified as being connected to the incumbent political party.
In the rest of this paper, in Sect. 2 we provide some background on the events of
interest, methodological issues and the hypotheses. In Sect. 3, we test convergence
versus partisan theories looking at the joint reaction of stock prices to the surprise
election result. In Sect. 4, we test some other theories that involve firm value expec-
tations, such as capture and agency theories. Section 5 introduces some notes on the
effects of the terror attacks. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The events
On Thursday March 11th 2004, a major terrorist attack killed 191 persons in commut-
ing trains in Madrid, the Spanish capital. On Sunday March 14th 2004, the Socialist
Party (PSOE) won the general election by a large though not overall majority (see
Fig. 1), beating all expectations as reported by electoral polls.
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Fig. 1 2004 General election results. Seats in Parliament by political party
The special circumstances surrounding the Spanish general election made its final
outcome completely unpredictable four days prior to the election,5 because it was then
that the terrorist attacks occurred. Until that day, the ruling Popular Party (PP) had
led the polls by 2 to 7 points, according to different poll sources (such as newspapers
El Pais, El Mundo, ABC). In fact, according to a poll performed after the election by
an official body in Spain (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas -C.I.S.6), 21.5% of
voters declared being influenced by the terrorist attacks in their voting decision. More
interestingly, 9.4% of voters voted for PSOE only because of the terrorist attacks,
while only 1.5% of voters voted PP because of the very same reason. It is clarifying
to see that the difference between these two values is 7.9%. As the final results gave a
5 point advantage to the Socialist party, it leaves the results, discounting the effect of
the terrorist attack on voters’ decisions, in a 2.9 point lead by the PP, which is roughly
consistent with poll results prior to the terrorist attacks.
García Montalvo (2011) provides statistical evidence that indeed the attacks
changed the expected result of the election. By using the postal vote, which by the
electoral rules was sent by absent voters prior to the terrorist attack, as a control group,
the study shows that this was significantly different from the vote on election day. The
attack had an important electoral impact, rejecting the hypothesis that the identity of
the winner was unaffected by the terrorist attack. To be precise, this study claims that
the incumbent conservative party would have won the election, had the terrorist attack
5 The poll that gave the incumbent Popular Party (PP) the narrowest advantage among all published polls
over the Socialist Party (PSOE) was published in newspaper La Vanguardia seven days before election
day (polls cannot be made public by law in Spain after five days before election day, and the last ones are
usually published seven days before, on the previous Sunday). According to this poll, PP was at that time
two percentage points ahead of the Socialist Party.
6 Estudio Postelectoral del CIS, Marzo-Abril 2004.
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Table 1 From March 11 to March 14
Thursday 11th
07:47 Four trains in Madrid are simultaneously bombed. 191 persons are killed and over 1500
are injured
13:00 The incumbent President J.M. Aznar reports that ETA is behind the attacks
15:50 The Government leaks a file from the Spanish Intelligence Service pointing to ETA as the
most likely author of the attacks
20:20 A. Acebes, Minister of the Spanish Home Office, informs of the finding of a tape in
Arabic in a suspicious van, but keeps the hypothesis of ETA as the most likely
21:30 The Islamic group Abu Hafs Al Masri, linked to Al Qaeda, claims they authored the
attacks
Friday 12th
18:00 A.Acebes repeats that ETA is the main hypothesis that the police is pursuing
18:30 ETA claims it had nothing to do with the attacks
Saturday 13th
16:00 Three Moroccan and two Indian men are arrested by the Spanish police
19:00 Demonstrators gather in front of PP headquarters in all major Spanish cities, asking for a
clear information policy on the authors of the attacks
20:30 A.P. Rubalcaba, a former Cabinet Minister and member of PSOE’s direction, strongly
criticizes the role of the Government
Sunday 14th
20:00 The election day reaches its end. PSOE win the election
Sources El Mundo, El País
not taken place, reaching a range between 42 and 45% of the vote, while the Socialist
party would have obtained 37%.
Therefore, there is a strong case to hypothesise that returns onMondaymorning, the
day after the election took place, would incorporate the impact of an unexpected polit-
ical change (if the semi-strong version of the financial markets efficiency hypothesis
holds7). If any company’s or economic sector’s profit was contingent on the political
outcome of the election, their valuation must have significantly changed after the vote,
as the results were not expected.
There have been many interpretations of why the terrorist attacks had such an
importance in the election results. A stream of opinion suggested that the terror-
ist attacks confirmed the general opinion in Spain that the PP Government’s deci-
sion to get involved in the Iraq war was a mistake. Opinion polls showed that
almost 85% of Spaniards opposed the war in Iraq. Others argue that the main
cause of the fall down of the PP was not caused by the terrorist attacks them-
selves, but by the management of the subsequent crisis by the incumbent Govern-
ment. When the attacks occurred in the morning of Thursday 11th March 2004 (see
Table 1), the initial reaction by most analysts and politicians was to blame ETA,
the Basque separatist terrorist group and by far the most active terrorist group in
Spain over the last 30 years.8 Nevertheless, the evidence soon pointed to Al-Qae-
da and later the very same day of the attacks most international press was assum-
7 According to this version of the hypothesis, stock prices summarize all publicly available information
about a particular stock. Then, only new information affects stock prices.
8 See Abadie and Gardeazábal (2003).
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ing that the attacks had been perpetrated by Islamist terrorist groups. Yet the PP
Government kept on blaming ETA for the next four days, until the Election Day
(see Table 1). Some commentators suggested that the PP feared losing the elec-
tion if the public concluded that Islamist groups targeted Spain as a result of the
Spanish Government’s support of the Irak war. In addition, the PP focused its pre-
election message on the fight against ETA and on the influence of ETA’s separatist
objectives on nationalist forces in the periphery willing to support a new Social-
ist government. Therefore, following this line of reasoning, if the PP Government
could hold off the three days remaining until the election blaming ETA, any nega-
tive impact on their electoral prospects would be averted and this would reinforce
their campaign message. Some commentators noted that the Government was not
really interested in transparently investigating the attacks, which had a large emo-
tional impact on public opinion, but only in re-election. To many observers, this was
the cause of the unexpected results on the Election Day, Sunday the 14th of March,
2004.
Being the cause of the change in citizen preferences one thing or another, the fact is
that the actual results of the election were not the ones that could have been rationally
anticipated by the market before the attacks occurred. If any company’s or industry’s
profit depended on the political outcome of the election, their financial valuations
were bound to have changed significantly between Thursday 11th in the morning and
the opening of the stock market on Monday 15th, already after the election and the
week-end break in the stock market.
2.2 Methodology
We carry out an analysis of the effect on the financial markets of the political change
as a result of the March 2004 election in Spain. Based on the semi-strong version
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), if the political change had any effect on
the discounted expected future stream of profits of quoted companies, the markets
would have reacted to the new information accordingly. The special circumstances
surrounding this election make this occasion a unique opportunity to test for effects of
political change on the performance of specific groups of businesses and the Spanish
stock market as a whole.
The classical abnormal returns computation is not suitable for analysing the effects
of an event that affects a group of companies at the same moment in time. When there
is event clustering9 the covariance amongst returnswill not be zero, and the asymptotic
results of normality no longer hold. An alternative approach is proposed by Binder
(1985) which disaggregates the portfolio into a multivariate regression model sys-
tem of returns equations, with one equation for each of the firms experiencing the
events:
R1t = α1 + β1Rmt +
A∑
a=1
γ1a Dat + ε1t
9 Events affecting different firms occur at the same moment in time.
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R2t = α2 + β2Rmt +
A∑
a=1
γ2a Dat + ε2t (1)
...
Rnt = αn + βn Rmt +
A∑
a=1
γna Dat + εnt
where i = 1 . . . n are the number of companies we include; Rit are company i’s
stock returns10; Rmt are the stock market index returns; Dat is a dummy variable that
takes value 1 on the days of the events of interest and zero otherwise; αi , βi , and γia
are parameters to be estimated; and we allow the error terms (ε11, . . . , ε1t , ε21, . . . ,
ε2t , . . . , εn1, . . . , εnt ) to be heteroskedastic across firms but non-correlated across
time.
We estimate the model by either using the Ibex-35 index of the Madrid stock
exchange as Rmt (M1) or a constant mean returns model (M2) which implies that,
from the previous equations, we remove βi Rmt . This structure allows the coefficients
to differ across firms and is an application of the seemingly unrelated regression meth-
odology, SUR.11 This multivariate regression model assumes that the disturbances are
uncorrelated within each equation but allows for the errors to be contemporaneously
correlated across equations. It also presents a number of advantages compared to
more standard regression models generally used in event studies. First, it can test joint
hypotheses (using the Wald test for instance) while other approaches only test for
average effects. Secondly, this property also allows the coefficients not to cancel out
with each other when they have different signs i.e. if we want to test the joint effect
of an event that causes both positive and negative effects in the different firms tested,
by using an averaged time series we might conclude there is no effect as those might
cancel out. By employing SUR we indeed unveil these effects as long as they are sta-
tistically significant. Finally, SUR regression allows robustly testing event windows
of a reduced length by multiplying the length of the window across firms and hence
increasing the available degrees of freedom.
10 Daily returns can be obtained in the usual fashion





where Pt stands for prices at time t. Nevertheless, we use the logarithmic transformation
Rt = ln(Pt ) − ln(Pt−1)
where Rt = ln(rt + 1), which yields almost identical results, yet a more symmetric distribution, which
is clearly convenient for the sake of the analysis as it is far easier to derive the time-series properties of
additive processes (such as the natural logarithmic transformation) than of multiplicative processes.
11 This methodology is also used in a study of financial market perspectives of political expectations by
Roberts (1990), without using the bootstrap technique, as we do, to improve the reliability of significance
tests.
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Testing individual hypotheses is unproblematic under this framework as t tests can
consistently test hypotheses where restrictions are imposed in parameters estimated
by SUR estimation. However, we are especially interested in testing joint hypotheses,
which present some statistical challenges. Wald tests are available for this type of
equation but are only valid asymptotically. In small samples, these tests are biased
against the null and tend to over reject. This implies that whereas results are valid
when the null hypothesis is not rejected, we need to be cautious in the interpretation
of those cases where the null is rejected. Chou (2004) proposes bootstrap methods
to address the over rejection problem. Using Monte Carlo simulations, he shows that
bootstrapping the sample provides p values very close to the nominal size of the test.
The bootstrap method (Effron 1979) is a computationally intensive method that allows
computing the distribution of a test statistic by re-sampling the data.12 Horowitz (2001)
shows that critical values obtained from this method are always at least as accurate as
standard asymptotic theory.
For the purpose of the empirical analysis we propose the following procedure:
First, estimate with SUR. Second, test the hypothesis when necessary with the Wald
test, and in the case a null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level, bootstrap the test
to obtain the p values by re-sampling a certain number of times. As this method is
very computationally-intensive, we only compute the bootstrapped p values when the
null hypothesis is rejected robustly throughout the different models. Otherwise, we
are conservative and understand that there is no sufficient evidence to consider the
null rejected. The bootstrap method applied to the Wald test in a SUR framework is
applied by following the steps below (Chou 2004):
1. Estimate the model by Ordinary Least Squares and obtain the residuals
(εˆ1, εˆ2, . . . , εˆT ) and the parameters corresponding to the different alphas, betas
and gammas. Calculate the Wald test.
2. Estimate the model by Ordinary Least Squares without the observations cor-
responding to the event window and obtain the parameters of the model and
the residuals (εˆ1, εˆ2, . . . , εˆT1 , εˆT2 , . . . , εT ), where the event window comprises
observations between T1 and T2.
3. Repeat a large number of times the following steps:
a) Draw a bootstrap sample ε∗t from the residuals in 2. Compute the values
of (R1t , R2t , . . . , Rnt ) using the parameters from 2 and the bootstrapped
residuals ε∗t . Call the resulting values R∗1t , R∗2t , . . . , R∗nt ).
b) Estimate with OLS using the original independent variables data and the
bootstrapped dependent variable data (R∗1t , R∗2t , . . . , R∗nt ). Calculate the
Wald test and call it τ ∗.
4. Calculate the percentage of τ ∗’s that are greater than the Wald statistic computed
in 1, which provides the bootstrap p value of the test.
12 Sampling from the original sample. The idea underlying bootstrap is that we pretend that the sample is
the population. Thus, we obtain bootstrap samples by sampling from the (original) sample which gives a
consistent estimation of the distribution of a test statistic.
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This way, one can obtain reliable joint tests for the hypotheses of interest. These
joint tests can be either for all the companies in the sample (Sect. 3) or for groups of
them (Sect. 4).
We estimate the model for a sample of companies in the MCM (Madrid’s Continu-
ous Market) Stock Exchange. 125 companies were originally included in the data set.
However, only 87 companies were finally included in the estimation. The 38 remain-
ing companies were excluded because of either thin trading or incomplete data. The
estimation period ranges from May 2003 to December 2004, therefore having a pre-
event window from May 2003 to March 2004, and a post-event window from March
2004 to December 2004.We use daily returns data for Spanish companies in theMCM
Stock Exchange from Infomercados, a financial web site specialized in Spanish equity
markets.
Two event windows are included in the estimation, an event window for the terror-
ist attacks and a window for the period immediately following the general election.
The window for the terrorist attacks includes the day of the events, 11th of March,
and the day after it, Friday the 12th. In this case the news of the terrorist attacks
could not have been discounted, and therefore it does not make sense to include
the day before the event as is standard practice in many event studies. There are
two reasons for including this event window. In the first place, the attacks might
have had an effect on the stock markets by themselves. Secondly, as they were the
indirect cause for the change in the election results, economic agents might have
partially discounted when the attacks occurred that the PP was going to lose the
election, or more seemingly, that the probabilities of the PSOE to win the elec-
tion increased. Section 5 discusses in more detail the literature on terrorism and
economy and whether the empirical results are consistent with the methodological
approach.
The second event window corresponds to the impact of the Spanish general elec-
tion results. A three-day event window, which is usually the window length chosen for
general event studies with daily data, is not the most suitable length in this case. This
is because the effects of a change in a government are of a higher and deeper impor-
tance than particular events affecting a firm and it might take some days for traders
to analyse and understand the nature of the change to its whole extent. We therefore
prefer a five-day event window instead. For robustness of the results we roll back and
forward the window presenting results for groups of companies for each model with
4, 5 and 6 days event windows (meaning returns from March 15th to 18th, 15th to
19th, and 15th to 22nd). In Sect. 3, we also test for the joint significance of the attacks
plus the election as if they were a single event and we do this for windows between
the day of the attacks and the next Monday (3 days), Tuesday (4 days) and so on until
Monday of the following week (8 days).
Once the Wald test is computed, we proceed to compute the bootstrap p values in
those cases where the null hypothesis has been rejected consistently. The benchmark
we use for considering a null hypothesis robustly rejected is when at least in one of the
two models (M1 and M2) the null hypothesis has been rejected in the three different
event windows presented (4, 5 and 6 days). If this is the case, in Sects. 4 and 5 we
obtain bootstrap p values at least for the 5 days case.
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2.3 Hypotheses
We test two general hypotheses, both related to the political economy literature (see for
example Persson and Tabbellini 2000): the partisan theory of political parties and the
theory of collusion between politicians and business managers, which is also linked
with the theory of capture and the agency theory of a conflict of interest inside firms
and in the political arena.
• Convergence versus partisanship According to the partisanship theory, political
parties represent different constituencies with different interests. Due to political
transaction costs, issues need to be aggregated in a few dimensions, and political
parties differ in these broad dimensions. This is reflected for example in differ-
ent macroeconomic policies. Historically, the macro-economic differences that
were postulated assumed the existence of a trade-off between unemployment and
inflation, left parties being more pro-employment and right parties being more
anti-inflation (Hibbs 1977). More modernly, these macro-policies were assumed
to take the form of left parties being more pro-public investment and pro-welfare
state and right parties being more pro-market, pro-tax reductions or pro-supply
side policies, depending on the interpretation or emphasis (see Boix 1996). If a
higher inflation and a higher public deficit lead to increasing interest rates, this
would have a negative impact in general on firms’ profits, and we should expect
a higher probability of left-wing policies being implemented causing lower stock
valuations in general. Section 3 empirically tests these hypotheses.
• Political connections and capture Some authors, such as Herron et al. (1999),
claim that macro-level policies may hide partisan differences at the sector or com-
pany specific level. Even if public deficits or inflation end up being very similar
under right or left governments, differences in defence policies, environmental
issues or other policies affecting particular industries may be significantly differ-
ent. For example, using data for the 1992 US election, Herron et al. (1999) show
that 15 out of 74 sectors (20%) had a stock price performance which denoted that
investors in these sectors were not indifferent between presidential candidates.
Some groups of citizens and businesses may overcome free-riding problems and
organise in lobbies or interest groups to influence the policy choices of some pol-
iticians (Grossman and Helpman 2002). It is usually claimed that firm’ owners or
input providers may find it easier to overcome such free-riding problems than con-
sumers, the latter being more atomised and having less at stake per capita in many
policy areas. Geographical or historical reasons may also mean that the same firms
or groups of firms may find it easier to access some political parties than others.
Agency problems in politics (voters not perfectly controlling politicians) and inside
firms with dispersed shareholdings (shareholders not perfectly controlling man-
agers) may be at the root of collusion episodes between politicians and managers
(Trillas 2004). The intensity of political connections in major Spanish firms may
have been particularly prominent in Spain in 2004, as the privatization of major
firms selling the assets to a dispersed shareholding facilitated the appointment of
managers close to the PP government (Bel and Trillas 2005), something that a new
Socialist government would possibly try to reverse.
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Additionally, in Spain in the first years of the XXI Century, one important
specific industry was subject to important policy controversies: the electric-
ity industry. This industry was experiencing a takeover wave all over Europe,
triggered by the liberalization of energy at the European Union level. As a
result, all major Spanish electricity firms were actors in the market for cor-
porate control, either as targets or acquires. The two main political parties
in Spain approached the issue with the objective of keeping Spanish firms
under Spanish owners, but whereas the Popular Party tried to do this between
1996 and 2004 by trying to stop any takeover and any subsequent reduction
in the number of firms, the Socialist party hinted during the 2004 electoral
campaign that it would not block mergers between Spanish firms (see Tril-
las 2010). Section 4 presents the empirical results resulting from testing such
hypotheses.
3 The joint impact of the election on all the firms in the sample
By testing the hypothesis that the attacks and the election had a significant impact
on all the companies in the sample, we are effectively testing whether the surprise
election following the terror attacks had a significant effect on the stock market as a
whole.
In order to do this, we perform a Wald test to the dummy variables and bootstrap
results when the variable results are significant due to over-rejection problems of the
test in the SUR framework.13 Now the Wald test is performed to the whole of the 87
companies included. Table 2 reports the results, distinguishing between models M1
andM2 and the different event windows used. It is important to note that the goodness
of fit for individual businesses regressions carried out with the M2 structure is con-
siderably lower than with M1. We nevertheless present both outputs in the tables of
results to provide evidence of the persistence (or non-persistence) of the results under
different econometric specifications.
As inspection of Table 2 shows, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of no
effect of the terror attacks across the different event windows. Nevertheless the boot-
strap exercise in the 5-day event window shows that there is no statistically significant
effect of the terror attacks in the market as a whole. In the case of the election effect,
the asymptotical critical values of the Wald test itself already do not reject the null
hypothesis of no effect in 4 out of 6 cases. In order to verify this result, we compute
the bootstrap structure of the test in the other 2 cases, resulting in both cases in the
confirmation of the no effect hypothesis. As a whole, one would conclude that neither
the terror attacks nor the election result affected the Spanish economy as a whole. That
would reject partisanship and it would be consistent with convergence theories such
as the median voter theorem.
This methodology has not been used by other studies that test for the effect of politi-
cal results on the stock market as a whole. Traditionally, these studies (see for example
Vuchelen 2003) regress a national stock market index with dummy variables for the
13 As discussed in Sect. 2.2, we then perform the bootstrap in the 5-day window case.
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4 days 5 days 6 days 4 days 5 days 6 days
Terror Attacks Effect Wald test 117.56 117.92 119.57 107.55 107.94 109.41
p values 0.0162 0.0153 0.0118 0.0699 0.0637 0.0525
Bootstrap p values – 0.2359 – – 0.3017 –
T×N 174 174 174 174 174 174
Wald test 116.40 97.33 102.14 115.17 97.97 97.96
Election Effect p values 0.0194 0.2106 0.1278 0.0233 0.1978 0.1982
Bootstrap p values 0.2470 – – 0.3966 – –
T×N 348 435 522 348 435 522
Wald tests on the significance of abnormal returns in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks (terror
attacks effect) are always performed on two-day windows, corresponding to Thursday 11th March and Fri-
day 12th March 2004. The table presents the results of these two-day window tests under different model
specifications including election results windows of 4, 5 and 6 days
dates in which there were political events. We also did this (and it is available upon
request) with mixed results: the variable for the terror attacks was significant (more
on this in Sect. 5) but not the variables including the effect of the election results.
However, it is doubtful in statistical terms that one can infer any conclusions from
such simple approach. More specifically, one cannot invoke a central limit theorem
with 2 observations (in the case of the terror attacks).
Both the election results and the bombings could have had more long-term effects
on the financial returns of businesses than those that can be captured in the event win-
dows presented above. To address this question we both tested for structural break in
M1 and M2 and considered the effects of the results in stock market volatility. Results
from the Chow test of structural break indicate that the impact of either the election
or the terrorist attacks did not suppose a break in the time series and therefore the
relation between the parameters and the dependent variables is stable both before and
after the events.
The events could also have had an impact on stock market volatility. In fact we
estimated a series of ARCH and GARCH regressions on the returns of the IBEX-35,
and tested for an impact on the volatility during the event windows, with the results
indicating a weakly significant and positive impact on volatility during the terror-
ist attacks window and a negative and non-significant impact for the election results
window. However and as discussed above, it is statistically doubtful one can extract
conclusions from such a procedure where a Central Limit theorem is invoked with 2
and 5 observations respectively.
Another possibility to analyse longer-term effects is to simply extend the event
window to cover a longer period of time and therefore increase the power of the test.
We considered an event window for the whole period after the events (over 200 days
of trading) and the results indicate a significantly lower volatility than for the period
preceding the election. It is however not possible to explain this effect on the basis of
the events considered in this article, as long event windows fail to isolate the impact
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of one specific exogenous factor (the election or the bombings) and instead capture
the impact of any event occurring during that period of time.
Table 3 presents the results from testing the impact of both events on the market
as a whole (as in Table 2), but with a joint event window covering both the bombings
and the post-election period. The table shows that the joint effects of the attacks and
the election were only significant, although with border line significance levels, if we
take the narrowest possible event window (two days for the pre-election window and
one day for the post-election window).
Overall, the results outlined in this section only strengthen the argument that the
surprise political result had no impact on the Spanish stock market as a whole even
though they weakly suggest that the market reacted abnormally immediately after the
bombings. We develop this argument further in Sect. 4. The findings however do not
rule out an impact on specific economic sectors or on some businesses politically
connected to either PP or PSOE. The following section introduces the methodological
approach to testing these hypotheses and presents its results.
4 Testing the impact of political connections using individual companies’
or sectors’ expectations
4.1 Impact on economic sectors
Political partisanship implies that different parties have different visions about the
priorities of the country and, in the equilibrium of the platform setting game, they run
with different platforms into the elections, and the platform of the winning party is
implemented. For example, a hypothetical partisan industrial policy of the Spanish
Socialist party could be a will to restructure the electricity market in Spain, attaining a
higher concentration of firms and creating ‘national champions’ in the electricity mar-
ket, capable of competing in the European Energy Market, due to come into force in
June 2007. We do not imply with this that PSOE favours ‘national champions’ while
PP does not. In fact, the PP Government (1996–2004) threatened to use its golden
share to stop the merger of Telefónica with the Dutch company KPM. Bel and Trillas
(2005) find evidence in this particular case that this Government’s veto was not driven
by a will to protect Telefónica’s shareholders, but by the fear of losing its residual con-
trol over the company. The partisan hypothesis is not about PSOE generally favouring
‘national champions’ and PP not. It is contingent specifically to the electricity sector,
as the PP Government had committed itself on keeping the number of companies in
the electricity market, and had honoured the commitment by stopping any merger.
The arrival of a PSOE government might have caused a change on the prospects of
the sector, by making possible the completion of successful transactions in the market
for corporate control.
If this were the case, then again the political change in Spain on March 2004 would
have caused abnormal returns on the electricity sector as a whole, as the effect of a
prospective partisan policy of the socialist party in the electricity sector would have
caused the returns to differ from zero, negatively or positively depending on the mar-
ket’s estimate of this policy’s effects.
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We test whether whole economic sectors are affected by partisan policies, much
in the same way as it is done in Herron (2000) for the American economy.14 Using
the Wald test, we formulate for every sector in the Spanish economy the following
hypothesis:
[
H0 : γ1a = γ2a = · · · = γsa = 0
HA : NoH0 (2)
where i = 1 . . . s, and s is the number of companies in a particular sector, while the
gammas are the parameter coefficients related to the political change event window.
We use the official industry division of the MCM Stock Exchange to test for the
hypothesis that a particular sector was affected by the election results (see Appendix
Table 10 for a breakdown of companies by sector). Table 4 shows that the only eco-
nomic sector where the null hypothesis is rejected in all cases is the electricity and
gas sector. In this sector, in 5 cases the null is rejected at the 1% confidence interval
and in one case at the 5% confidence interval. The bootstrap p values in Table 8 con-
firm such levels of significance for the rejection of the null hypothesis. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that the winners had a partisan interest in changing the
structure of the electricity and gas market. However, as Appendix Table 11 shows,
some of the companies covered in this sector were also politically connected to the
incumbent Government. This poses the question of whether the observed impact on
their financial returns was due to the different policy platforms in which the two polit-
ical parties were running the election in regards to the electricity sector or whether
the abnormal returns observed reflect the impact on some of the businesses in the
sector from losing political connections to the incumbent Government. Section 4.2
explores this further by specifically analysing the impact on politically connected
businesses.
The media sector is affected in 5 out of 6 cases, but only at the 10% confidence level
using the standard asymptotic critical values. The bootstrap p values show that with
M1 the effects are not statistically significant while using M2 they remain significant
at the 10% confidence interval. However, as discussed in Sect. 3, our confidence in
M2 is substantially lower than in M1, given the low goodness of fit of the model to the
data, and therefore we cannot draw firm conclusions from this marginal significance
level. This result might also express the fact that relevant companies in the sector such
as Recoletos, Telecinco or Antena3 were missing data and could not be included in
the regression model. This resulted in only three companies being included, two of
them closely related one to another (Prisa and Sogecable), and commonly considered
to be connected to the Socialist party.
14 We also test whether political change had a significant effect on each company separately. We perform
the t test on all companies included in the estimation (available upon request). Only 3 companies out of
a sample of 87 have significant abnormal returns robust to the estimation with both M1 and M2 and the
different size of the event windows: Iberpapel, a paper company, Endesa, and Red Eléctrica Española,
the two latter ones both electricity companies. Endesa has in all the 6 cases negative abnormal returns at
the 1% confidence interval.
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Table 4 Effect of the election results on specific industries: Wald test
Event window length M1 M2 N×T
4-days 5-days 6-days 4-days 5-days 6-days 4-days 5-days 6-days
Oil NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8 10 12
Electricity RHo*** RHo*** RHo** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** 24 30 36
and gas
Water and others – – – – – – – – –




Machinery goods NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** 20 25 30
Construction NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** 20 25 30
Construction NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8 10 12
materials
Chemical – – – – – – – – –
industry
Engineering – – – – – – – – –
Aerospacial – – – – – – – – –
Food and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 24 30 36
beverages
Clothes NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 16 20 24
Paper and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* NoRHo NoRHo 20 25 30
graphic arts
Cars – – – – – – – – –
Pharmaceutical NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 16 20 24
and Biotechnology
Other NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8 10 12
consumption goods
Tourism and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 12 15 18
entertainment
Trade – – – – – – – – –
Media RHo* RHo* RHo* RHo* RHo* NoRHo 12 15 18
Transport and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8 10 12
distribution
Highways and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8 10 12
parkings
Other services – – – – – – – – –
Banking NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 44 55 66
Insurance NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo* 8 10 12
Financial – – – – – – – – –
investment NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 16 20 24
Real Estate
Telecommuni NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* NoRHo NoRHo 16 20 24
cations
Electronics NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo** RHo* RHo*** 8 10 12
and software
H0: No effect on the sector for the election results
RHo (Null Hypothesis is rejected). NoRHo (Null Hypothesis is not rejected)
When in a certain sector there are not at least two companies, Wald test is not performed
Values under N×T indicate the number of observations available for the testing of the hypothesis in each
case
*** 1% confidence interval; ** 5% confidence interval; * 10% confidence interval
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4.2 Testing the impact of political connections
Any theory making predictions about the determinants of firm’s profits, be these reg-
ulatory policies, movements in the corporate control market, managerial or rivals’
decisions, etc., can be tested by an event study, if the event is not anticipated. Partisan
versus convergence theories are certainly not the only ones that can be tested. We
focus here on the potential of this event study to shed light on capture and agency
theories relating to the relationship between firms and politicians in Spain.
This part of the exercise is related to the literature on political connections, which
emerged from the pioneering contributions by Fisman (2001) and Faccio (2006). The
latter constructs a database, including over 20,000 publicly-traded firms in 47 coun-
tries, reporting aboutmembers of boards of directors that have a previous or subsequent
experience in politics, and documents a significant increase in corporate value when
those involved in politics enter the business sector. Fisman (2001) shows that firms
linked to the Suharto family experienced a significant decrease in shareholder value
when news negatively associated to the dictator’s health were known. Since then, a
number of studies have computed the economic advantages for firms’ shareholders of
being connected at the board level with politicians. For example, Ferguson and Voth
(2008) show that firms connected to the Nazi party experienced positive abnormal
returns associated to the rise of Hitler’s party to the German government.15
Elsewhere (see Bel and Trillas 2005) it has been suggested that corporate gover-
nance in large Spanish firms give a lot of discretion to managers, and that they may
take advantage of this great discretion by sharing rents with politicians in exchange
for favours to political parties, in the form of appointing party cronies, funding media
empires or supporting particular policies. In this case, an unexpected change in the
ruling party implies a break in long term collusion contracts and possibly the signing
of new contracts, for example by favouring the government the appointment of new
managers through pressures over key shareholders.
Agency problems may explain the fact that society is not fully able of controlling
politicians, who can take decisions seeking particular and not general interests. Bel
and Trillas (2005) find evidence consistent with collusion between the PP Govern-
ment (1996–2004) and the managers of Telefónica, a telecommunications firm. Other
state-owned companies where this type of collusion between managers and politicians
could have happened were privatised as well during the PP government. If this were
the case, abnormal returns would have been experienced in these companies when the
PSOE won the election.
In order to test the impact of the election on politically connected businesses, we
searched on the archives of Google News for press articles containing references to
Board Members of companies in the sample of this article at the time when the sur-
prise political result occurred.16 46 of the 87 companies resulted in having at least one
politically connected Board Member. We then classify connections according to their
strength in four different categories:
15 Other examples of this literature are Boubakri et al. (2008) and Goldman et al. (2008).
16 Search performed over the period July 2010–November 2010. The original press articles are available
under request.
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1. Former Minister/Junior Minister/Position of high responsibility in a Government
(either National or Regional Government)/Senior member of a political party.
2. Appointed to manage or lead a public company/Held other senior positions either
in Government or in private sector as appointed by Government.
3. Has very clear links to, is close to, a political party.
4. Reported links to a political party but such relationship is not irrefutable.
There are several ways in which we could define a company to be politically con-
nected. In the broadest possible definition we could define as connected any of the 46
companies whichwere identified as having a connection of any degree (1–4). However
this approach would define as equally connected a company with most Board mem-
bers being connected with degree 1 and a company with one connection of degree 4.
Because we only want to identify as connected those companies where the evidence
of political connection is stronger, we establish stricter conditions and provide four
different definitions for a company being considered as connected, being (a) the most
restrictive definition and (d) the most relaxed:
(a) At least 4 Board Members are connected with a strength of connection catego-
rised as 1 or 2
(b) At least 25% of Board Members are connected with a strength of connection
categorised as 1 or 2
(c) At least 4 Board Members are connected with any strength of connection (1–4)
(d) At least 25% of Board Members are connected with any strength of connection
(1–4)
Companies resulting as connected under each category (see Appendix Table 11)
are then tested for abnormal returns following the election with the two standard mod-
els of financial returns (M1 and M2) and different lengths of event windows for the
election results (4–6 days).
Table 5 presents the results from running a Wald test on the financial returns of
both connected and non-connected businesses during the post-election window as in
(3). The results of the test show significant abnormal returns for connected companies
when asymptotic p values are taken into account. Significance levels are 1% when
T = 4 and vary between 1 and 10% when T = 6. Due to the problems of over
rejection of the Wald test under the SUR framework outlined in Sect. 2, we also cal-
culate the bootstrap significance levels of the abnormal returns in those cases where
the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is rejected when T = 5. The results are
less concluding after calculating bootstrap p values as even though the test rejects
the null hypothesis in most groupings, significance levels are lower at between 5 and
10% confidence interval levels. Therefore we can only say that there is some weak
evidence that the profit expectations of connected businesses were impacted by the
surprise political result.
Connected companies as identified so far include companies connected either to
PSOE, PP or to both parties, hence results may disguise that only companies con-
nected to one party experienced a change in their profits expectations as a result of the
surprise political change. To explore this further, for politically connected companies
we establish whether the company is connected to PSOE, PP or whether it has con-
nections to both parties. We define a company as connected to PP (PSOE) if more than
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Table 5 Impact of the election results on politically connected firms (Wald test asymptotic and bootstrap
p values)
Grouping Type of business M1 M2 N
T = 4 T = 5 T = 6 T = 4 T = 5 T = 6
a Non-connected 0.5105 0.8667 0.5863 0.3891 0.83 0.4196 79
Connected 0.0045 0.0028 0.0314 0.0013 0.0015 0.0055 8
Bootstrap p values 0.0201 0.0304
b Non-connected 0.5303 0.924 0.5862 0.441 0.9046 0.4209 76
Connected 0.0015 0.0008 0.0243 0.0005 0.0005 0.0055 11
Bootstrap p values 0.0264 0.0284
c Non-connected 0.6917 0.8639 0.6626 0.5864 0.8434 0.504 72
Connected 0.0029 0.0141 0.0799 0.001 0.0084 0.0219 15
Bootstrap p values 0.1068 0.0677
d Non-connected 0.593 0.8782 0.6611 0.4669 0.8497 0.5123 65
Connected 0.0045 0.0172 0.0985 0.0019 0.0122 0.0349 22
Bootstrap p values 0.0962 0.0976
Bootstrap p values are calculated for t = 5 if significant abnormal returns are encountered for a particular
grouping of companies
Table 6 Impact of the election results on PP connected, PSOE connected and mixed strategy businesses
(asymptotic and bootstrap Wald test p values)
Grouping Type of business M1 M2 N
T = 4 T = 5 T = 6 T = 4 T = 5 T = 6
a PP connected 0.0002 0.0001 0.0049 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 4
PSOE connected 0.9196 0.6366 0.3863 0.3286 0.3005 0.0701 1
Mixed strategy 0.8873 0.9333 0.7359 0.7257 0.7646 0.2686 3
Bootstrap p values 0.0028 0.0042
b PP connected 0.0001 0.0001 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 6
PSOE connected 0.6617 0.8846 0.7411 0.9322 0.5853 0.7517 1
Mixed strategy 0.7045 0.4482 0.5597 0.7463 0.4761 0.2694 3
Bootstrap p values 0.0028 0.01
c PP connected 0.001 0.0027 0.0443 0.0004 0.0014 0.0086 9
PSOE connected 0.8532 0.7489 0.5477 0.3091 0.3818 0.0883 2
Mixed strategy 0.4713 0.8191 0.5769 0.1795 0.5782 0.1416 4
Bootstrap p values 0.0212 0.0053
d PP connected 0. 0005 0.0011 0.0276 0.0002 0.0006 0.006 12
PSOE connected 0.9085 0.903 0.7411 0.4762 0.5853 0.1814 3
Mixed strategy 0.6116 0.7805 0.7246 0.1953 0.4727 0.2498 6
Bootstrap p values 0.0349 0.0174
70% of Connected Board Members are connected to PP (PSOE). If less than 70%
of Board Members are connected to any one given party we define the company as
being connected with a mixed strategy. We then run specific Wald tests for companies
connected to PP, PSOE or with a mixed strategy. Where the null hypothesis of no sig-
nificant impact is rejected, we obtain bootstrap p values for the 5-day event window
as in Sect. 3 to overcome the over rejection problems (Table 6).
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The results indicate that businesses connected to the incumbent political party expe-
rienced strong abnormal returns after the election, with confidence intervals of boot-
strap p values being statistically significant at the 1–5% level depending on the model
and grouping used in the test. Non-connected businesses, businesses connected to the
opposition party and businesses connected to both PP and PSOE did not experience
significant abnormal returns.
It has to be noted that we have a limited amount of data available for testing the
hypotheses in some of the Wald tests presented in Table 7. However tests performed
on companies connected to PP generally have a sufficiently large number of obser-
vations, between 30 in grouping 1 (T = 5 and N = 6) and 60 in grouping 4 (T = 5
and N = 12). This, combined with the persistence of the statistical significance of
the results under different regression models, event windows, groupings of compa-
nies, and asymptotic and bootstrap significance levels reinforces the robustness of the
results.
The expectation of a potential change in the value of political connections for PP
connected companies seems therefore to be at the root of the abnormality of the returns
during the election window. The results from the Wald test identify that the behaviour
of stock market returns is significantly abnormal but they do not provide information
on whether this impact is positive or negative. As outlined at the beginning of this
section, capture and political connections, jointly with agency problems within com-
panies, suggest that a company losing political connections to the Government may
have either a positive or a negative impact on a company’s prospects of profitabil-
ity. On the one hand, if society is not fully able of controlling politicians these may
then collude with some businesses providing a private benefits to these businesses’
shareholders. If this were the case, we would expect businesses connected to the PP to
experience abnormal negative returns as a result of the surprise election result. On the
other hand, if in addition to agency problems between society and politicians there are
agency problems between managers and shareholders, managers could collude with
politicians to the detriment of both shareholders and citizens. In such case a change
in Government could produce positive abnormal returns.
As t tests for individual companies cannot be robustly performed given the low
number of observations available (between 4 and 6 for each company in the post-
election window) it is not possible to robustly answer this question with the data
available to us. We did perform such tests anyway and these showed negative and
significant effects for some PP-connected companies (e.g. Endesa) and positive and
significant for others (e.g. Iberia). This may suggest that both factors may have had a
role in explaining the abnormal returns observed for PP connected businesses in the
aftermath of the election. Figure 2 illustratively shows the financial returns of some
of the largest PP-connected companies during the post-election window against the
returns of the IBEX-35 stock market index.
Finally, there might be several reasons why a change in Government had only an
impact on the financial returns of businesses connected to the incumbent party but
not to businesses connected to the opposition party or to businesses connected to both
parties. In the first place, whereas it may be possible for traders to understand the
value to a particular company of being politically connected to the incumbent party,
it may take some more time to obtain reliable information on the financial value of
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Table 7 Effect of the terrorist attacks on economic sectors: Wald test
Event window length M1 M2 N×T
4-days 5-days 6-days 4-days 5-days 6-days
Oil NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** RHo** RHo** 4
Electricity and gas RHo** RHo** RHo** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** 12
Water and others – – – – – – –
Minerals, metals and
transformation of metal 4
products RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo***
Machinery goods NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 10
Construction – – – – – – 10
Construction materials NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo* 4
Chemical industry – – – – – – –
Engineering – – – – – – –
Aerospacial – – – – – – –
Food and beverages NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** RHo** RHo** 12
Clothes NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8
Paper and graphic arts NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 10
Cars – – – – – – –
Pharmaceutical and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8
Biotechnology
Other consumption NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo* 4
goods
Tourism and RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** 6
entertainment
Trade – – – – – – –
Media NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 6
Transport and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** RHo** RHo** 4
distribution
Highways and parkings NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 4
Other services – – – – – – –
Banking NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 22
Insurance NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 4
Financial investment – – – – – – –
Real Estate NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 8
Telecommunications NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo* 8
Electronics and NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo 4
software
Technological hardware – – – – – – –
H0: No effect on the sector for the terrorist attacks
RHo (Null Hypothesis is rejected). NoRHo (Null Hypothesis is not rejected)
When in a certain sector there are not at least two companies, Wald test is not performed
Values under N×T indicate the number of observations available for the testing of the hypothesis in each
case
*** 1% confidence interval; ** 5% confidence interval; * 10% confidence interval
connections to a new Government. Secondly, loss aversion bias, as identified in the
behavioural finance literature (see Tversky and Kahneman 1991), may have played a
role in explaining that businesses losing a political connection were penalised more
heavily than businesses gaining political connections to the new Government. Finally,
it needs to be noted that at the point the election took place, only a limited number
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Fig. 2 Financial returns after the election for selected PP-connected businesses
of companies where connected to the opposition party, hence reducing the power of
the Wald test. The number of companies connected to the PSOE range from 1 to 3
under the different specifications, with a window of T = 5 meaning the test is run with
only 5 to 15 observations. As Appendix Table 11 shows, the number of companies
connected to the incumbent political party when the election took place was con-
siderably larger. For example, during the PP Government six large companies were
privatised—Telefónica (which afterwards spun-off Telefónica móviles), Argentaria
(which became after a merger BBVA), Iberia, Altadis, Endesa and Repsol—, with
most of them being identified as connected to PP in our analysis.
5 A remark on the effects of the terrorist attacks
The terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11 2004 had a potential double effect on
the economy. First, the attacks might have directly affected certain economic sec-
tors. Second, the attacks might have had the effect of increasing the probability of
PSOE winning the election, and therefore if any company or group of companies
were affected (positively or negatively) by the change of government, the effect of the
terrorist attacks on their returns would have been different from zero. This is why in
our model we used two different event windows (one for the terrorist attacks, another
for the election results), in order to avoid considering as consequences of the election
results something that was directly related to the attacks themselves. In this short sec-
tion, we want to show this double effect of the attacks with an example of its effect
on specific industries and show how the proposed approach of using two separate
windows is largely successful in isolating the direct impacts of the terrorist attacks
and the direct impacts of a change in Government.
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The literature on the effects of terrorist attacks on the economy17 points towards
a negative impact of terrorism on overall economic growth18 and also some specific
impacts on particular economic sectors. A considerable attention has been paid to the
significant and negative impact of terrorist attacks on the tourist sector, for example
in Enders and Sandler (1991), Enders et al. (1992) and Richardson et al. (2007). A
negative effect on foreign direct investment has also been reported by scholars, for
example in Enders and Sandler (1996) and Abadie and Gardeazábal (2008). Finally,
Abadie and Dermisi (2008) analyze the impact of terrorist attacks on the office real
estate markets in large financial centers, their results suggesting that economic activity
in Central Business Districts can be greatly affected by changes in the perceived level
of terrorism.
Table 7 presents the effects of the attacks by industry as in Table 4. Table 8 presents
the bootstrap p values for those industries where the null hypothesis of no effect of
the terrorist attacks is rejected robustly. Three industries are identified as affected by
the terrorist attacks: Tourism and entertainment, Minerals, metals and transformation
of metal products and Electricity and gas. As shown in Table 2 the only of these three
industries affected by the election result was Electricity and gas. Results reported in
Table 4 suggest that the two former sectors were genuinely affected by the attacks
themselves as abnormal returns disappear for the post-election window, even though
we need to be cautious given the reduced number of observations employed for car-
rying out the tests (see Table 7). The effect on the Electricity and gas sector however
could be also related with the variation in the likely winner of the election that was
being held three days after the attacks occurred and the fact that most companies in the
sector were also connected to the PP party. This is consistent with results discussed
above in Sect. 4.
Overall, given the economic literature on the impact of terrorism and the empirical
results provided in this article, there is no obvious reason to think that those businesses
connected to the PP would have been more directly affected by the bombings than
any other company in our sample. Companies connected to the PP are from different
sectors of the economy, many of them not affected directly by the terrorist attacks
neither according to the literature or by the empirical results in Tables 7 and 8.
To provide further support to the use of the two separate windows, we did test for
the impact of the two-day terror attack effect on PP connected businesses, with mixed
results (see Table 9). Testing the impact with M1, the model with the best goodness
of fit, suggests strongly that no abnormal returns where observed in PP companies in
the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks. Of the four groupings of PP connected
businesses considered, only one case shows a weak significant impact, and this is at
the 10% confidence interval level. However when testing the hypothesis with M2, a
more simplistic model with a lower goodness of fit, the Wald test provides levels of
significance across the four groupings considered, even though at varying degrees of
significance between 1 and 10%confidence interval levels. This resultmay be spurious
given the poor goodness of fit of such model and the reduced number of observations
17 See Frey et al. (2007) and Blomberg and Hess (2008) for surveys.
18 That is clearly the case of the Basque Country in Spain, as reported by Abadie and Gardeazábal (2003).
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Table 8 Bootstrap p values obtained from the 5-days election results event window model, compared to
the p values of the Wald test
M0 M7 N×T
Wald Bootstrap Wald Bootstrap
Election results
Media 0.099 0.119 0.079 0.086 15
Electronics – – 0.095 0.106 10
Electricity 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 30
Insurance – – 0.070 0.112 10
Electricity 0.042 0.091 0.002 0.022 12
Terrorist attacks
Minerals 0.031 0.058 0.004 0.023 4
Construction materials – – 0.067 0.113 4
Food and beverages – – 0.048 0.101 12
Other consumption goods – – 0.071 0.092 4
Tourism and entertainment 0.005 0.030 0.000 0.007 6
Transport and distribution – – 0.021 0.043 4
Telecommunications – – 0.086 0.118 8
Table 9 Impact on PP-connected businesses after the bombings
Grouping Type of business M1 terrorist M2 terrorist N×T
a PP connected 0.0682 (0.0869) 0.0013 (0.0127) 20
b PP connected 0.1225 0.0031 (0.0244) 30
c PP connected 0.1845 0.0056 (0.0486) 45
d PP connected 0.2424 0.0095 (0.0923) 60
Boostrap p values in bracket
in the Wald test (note that the statistical significance of the results decreases when
the sample size increases). In any case, the results provide at most some weak evi-
dence for slight abnormality of the financial returns of PP-connected businesses in the
immediate aftermath of the bombings, suggesting perhaps that in fact the potential
change in the expectations for the election results could have started to be discounted
from that point in time. This is problematic, as suggests that the use of two separate
windows in the analysis may not perfectly isolate the separate impacts of the bombings
and the surprise election results. In any case though, the results are clear in indicating
that any potential effect observed on PP companies in the immediate aftermath of the
bombings is considerably weaker than after the election, when the change in compa-
nies’ profit expectations was fully confirmed with the surprise results of the general
election.
6 Conclusions
This study shows that as a whole the forces of political convergence are quite strong.
Political rhetoric in Spain is acrimonious, and memories of the 1936–1939 Century
Civil War and the 1939–1975 Franco’s Dictatorship are (and have increasingly been
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in the recent past) commonly used in the political debate. Post-election political evo-
lution confirms that macroeconomic policy has not been the main political cleavage
between right and left in Spain. Although President Zapatero was portrayed by the
opposition as the most radical President in Spanish democratic history, the Finance
Minister since 2004 was Pedro Solbes, a former EU Commissioner committed with
fiscal discipline and macro-economic stability, who had also been Finance Minister in
the González governments of the early 1990’s, when Spain applied for membership
in the Euro area. The opposition focused on nationalist tensions as the main political
issue, and it concentrated on economic issues only on occasion of the takeover of the
electricity firm Endesa and similar matters related to corporate control and regula-
tory institutions (mainly microeconomic issues19). The overall results are consistent
with no partisanship (so no effect on expected macro policies such as fiscal policy,
inflation, public expenditure or unemployment policies that may affect the market
as a whole). Parties may indeed diverge in non-economic policy dimensions, such
as social, religious and cultural norms, foreign policy, or the degree of institutional
decentralization (for example, they bitterly fight over how to put an end to violence
in the Basque Country). But the profit expectations of the stock market as a whole
remained unaffected.
The results however also support the hypothesis that particular industries and busi-
nesses may be affected by the political structure of Spain and the nature of its busi-
ness-politicians networks.Anumber of companieswere indeed affected by the election
results analysed in this article, and the empirical results provide some support to the
hypothesis that the degree of political connectedness of such businesses is at the core
of explaining the impact of the surprise election results on their financial returns. Our
exercise is based on the event study methodology, which depends on market expecta-
tions and, in particular, the results aremeaningful only to the extent that the semi-strong
version of the efficient financial markets hypothesis holds. Besides, partisan macro-
economic effects could have an impact on agents that are not the investors in quoted
firms, but workers, consumers, or investors in other firms.
Differences over economic policies between right and left vary over time and across
countries; in 2004 in a Euro-area country such as Spain, there was no clear and robust
evidence of significant differences. However, capture and political connections, jointly
with agency problems within companies, appear to have had a significant impact on
those firms where such conditions were present, particularly when such connections
were with the incumbent Government.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
source are credited.
Appendix
See Tables 10 and 11.
19 Although in February 2007 the two main political parties were reaching an agreement on takeover and
competition policy legislations.
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Table 10 continued
Economic sector Company







Transport and distribution Iberia
Logista

























Electronics and software Amper
Indra
Technological hardware –
Table 11 Companies connected
under each grouping
Grouping a
Abertis, S.A. Mixed strategy
Banco Santander, S.A. Mixed strategy
Endesa, S.A. PP
Metrovacesa S.A. PP
Red Electrica Corporacion, S.A. PP
Repsol YPF, S.A. PP
Sogecable PSOE
Sol Melia,S.A. Mixed strategy
Grouping b
Adolfo Domínguez, S.A. PSOE
Endesa, S.A. PP
Iberia, Lineas Aereas de España, S.A. PP
Jazztel, P.L.C. Mixed strategy
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Red Electrica Corporacion, S.A. PP
Repsol YPF, S.A. PP
Sol Melia,S.A. Mixed strategy
Tecnocom, Telecomunicaciones y Energia, S. Mixed strategy
Turbacex PNV
Grouping c
Abertis, S.A. Mixed strategy
Acciona, S.A. PSOE
ACS, S.A. PP
Banco de Valencia PP
Banco Santander, S.A. PP
Enagas, S.A. PP
Endesa, S.A. PP
Gas Natural Sdg, S.A. Mixed strategy
Metrovacesa S.A. PP
Red Electrica Corporacion, S.A. PP
Repsol YPF, S.A. PP
Sogecable PSOE
Sol Melia, S.A. Mixed strategy





Adolfo Domínguez, S.A. PSOE
Banco de Valencia PP
Enagas, S.A. PP
Endesa, S.A. PP
Gas Natural Sdg, S.A. Mixed strategy
Iberia, Lineas Aereas de España, S.A. PP




Red Electrica Corporacion, S.A. PP
Repsol YPF, S.A. PP
Sogecable PSOE
Sol Melia,S.A. Mixed strategy
Tecnocom, Telecomunicaciones y Energia, S. Mixed strategy
Telefonica moviles Mixed strategy
Telefonica, S.A. PP
Turbacex PNV
Uralita, S.A. Mixed strategy
Viscofan, S.A. PP
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